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Regions Populated by the Kurds
Region! inhabited by the Kurdish Nation
INTRODUCTION
The Kurds are an ethnic minority easily distinguished by their 
culture, language, and national identity. The region they inhabit, 
Kurdistan, stretches across the corners of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, 
Syria, and the Soviet Union. The Kurdish struggle for autonomy 
provides a contemporary study of an oppressed people striving to 
liberate themselves. The Kurds are virtually unknown throughout 
most of the world. Yet their case of national self-determination 
has special merit.
This study focuses on developments within the Kurdish 
nationalist movement of Iran and Iraq since 1975. A significant 
Kurdish population is found in Turkey as well. Although this study 
does not emphasize their role in the national movement, many of the 
circumstances and principles of political culture are applicable. 
In an effort to understand the Kurds in Iran and Iraq as well as 
the conditions which sustain and have brought changes in this 
movement, it is important to examine first the roots of Kurdish 
nationalism, beginning with cultural influences. The political 
organization of the Kurds and major events in Iran and Iraq after 
1974 will be discussed in order to understand the complicated 
relationships between the organizations and the governments 
involved in the dispute. Finally, this study broadens to examine 
Kurdish political culture. Political culture identifies basic 
values and belief systems which influence the nu.ional community. 
It also recognizes the weaknesses of the movement and the influence
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of the tribal community on the emergence of nationalism.
KURDISH CULTURE
Culture is a unifying force among the Kurdish people. The 
Kurdish nation prides itself on its rich, ancient, culture.1 
Although many spiritual and material cultural products have been 
destroyed as a result of foreign occupation, much of it has 
survived. Kurdish folklore and literature are plentiful in popular 
legends. Poems written as early as the 10th century have also been 
found. The greatest of the poets include Baba Tahir (935-1010), 
whose poems are well known outside of Kurdistan, Mala Jasire of 
the 12th century, and Ahmade Khani (1650-1706), the greatest author 
of classical Kurdish literature. Other famous poets existed in the 
17th, 18th, and through the 20th century: all of which contributed 
to the ever-changing world of art and prose through-out Kurdistan.
Kurdish, the language of the poets and authors in Kurdistan, 
is of the Indo-European group. Although linguistically parallel 
to Farsi, the language of their Aryran brothers, Kurdish and Farsi 
are not mutually intelligible. Kurdish does not yet have a unitary 
written form. Their are two predominant dialects: Kermanji and 
Sorani. The Kermanji dialect is spoken in the Northwestern part 
of Kurdistan, where the majority of Kurds live.2 The dialect
1 See Ohassemlou, Abdul Rahman. Kurdistan and the Kurds. 
Collet's: London, 1965, p.29.
“This includes practically all the Kurds settled in Turkish 
Kurdistan, in Syria, in the Mosul area in Irag and north of Urmia 
in Iran.
3
prevailed in literature until the advent of World War I. Since 
then, the Sorani dialect has prevailed. Sorani is spoken in the 
southeastern region of Kurdistan. It flourished during the Mahabad 
republic of 1945-1946 and after the Iraqi revolution of 1958. 
Presently, the Sorani dialect is more widely used in Kurdish 
literature. However, it is important to note that the two dialects 
form one distinct language and are mutually intelligible: the
Kurds in the north are able to understand the Kurds of the south.3
Language is as important to the Kurds as Hebrew is to the 
Israelis. The Kurds have consistently demanded that the government 
allow Kurdish to be the national language in Kurdistan. The Kurds 
have asked repeatedly that the primary language of education be 
Kurdish. Only in Iraq have these demands been recognized.
The Kurdish people are the fourth largest group of people in 
the Middle East. No accurate figures are available from the 
respective governments because the states aim to underestimate the 
significance of the Kurdish population. However, the Kurds number 
between twelve and twenty million people. They inhabit the region 
of Kurdistan which spans across Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, with small 
enclaves in Syria and the Soviet Union. (See Map)
The majority of Kurds are Sunni Moslems: in Iran, seventy-
five percent of Muslim Kurds are Sunnis, twenty-five percent are 
Shi'ites.*  The Kurds were probably Zoroastriana who submitted to
3Ohassemlou, p.27.
*The Kurdish Shi1 ites of Iran live in the region of Xermanehah 
and in Luristan. Known as the Lurs. Challand, p.161.
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Islam after the Arab conquest. Some Kurds In Iraq practice a 
mystical approach to Islam called Suffism.5 In the Mosul region 
(in Iraq and Turkey) there also exists a significant number who 
adhere to the non-Muslim Yezidi religion. Finally, members of 
other religious groups and sects including the Sarlis, Qizilbash, 
Ahli Haqq (or All Allahi), Christians, and Jews are found among 
the Kurds.6
Education serves as a tool to install or insulate values of 
nationalism. It is of major importance for schools to advance 
state interests and ideology. This is the primary reason Kurdish 
schools remain in the hands of the central government. Both Iran 
and Turkey have prohibited the use of Kurdish in schools. In Iran, 
Kurds teach and write in Persian and few actually read Kurdish 
texts.7 In Iraq, however, Kurdish has been accepted as the primary 
language of instruction in regions where Kurds form the vast 
majority.6 Kurdish children are still required to learn Arabic in 
order to link them with the Iraqi society at large.
5 Pelletiere, Stephen. The Kurdss An Unstable Elelment in 
The Gulf. Westview Presst Boulder, Colorado, 1984, p.42.
6 Ohassemlou, p.26. Also see Wadi Jwaideh, The Kurdish 
Mationallet Movementt Its Origins and Development. University of 
Baghdad, 1942. p.47-51.
7 Saman de Slaband is an Iranian program associate at the 
Kurdish Library in Brooklyn, NY. Sven though Kurdish is his native 
tongue, he had never seen a Kurdish book until he came to the 
United States. C8M 2/8/89.
a McLaurin, R.D., Don Psrstz, Lewes Snider. Middle Beet 
Foreign Policy. Praeger Press! Mew York 1982, p.77
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The character of the Kurdish people is distinguished by their 
struggle for self-determination. They have been highly political, 
first organizing themselves in the late 1920s. The great will of 
the Kurds is well-known. In the early days, they outwitted the 
British by their outstanding and reckless horsemanship. Their 
endurance is also well-documented as the Kurds have served as 
mercenaries in great wars. Most notably, however, is the Kurds' 
ability to preserve their ide. tity while their mountainous region 
has been invaded by the Turks, Persians, Mongols, and Arabs.
Kurdish women enjoy a great deal of freedom and are highly 
respected in the community. Women play a role in the political 
stuggle as well. First, Kurdish women do not wear the veil nor 
are they secluded from society. They freely intermingle with men, 
and are not intimidated as neighboring Arab or Persian women. 
Women and men dance together at social events such as weddings and 
feasts. Obviously, this behavior demonstrates that Kurdish society 
and Kurdish social customs are relatively relaxed.9 The position 
of Kurdish women was also noted by the news correspondent David 
Adamson. He recorded men's claims that Kurdish women are "more 
intelligent, attractive, and independent than other Middle Eastern 
women." Kurdish women have also assumed leadership positions in 
the tribal community as well as the political community. Many 
women and schoolgirls played a role in the uprising of 1982 in 
Iraq. Women have also organized protests against political
See Jwaideh, p.109.9
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detainees outside of prisons.10 Jwaideh documents the influential 
role of the Kurdish woman in the home. Her counsel is highly 
respected and usually heeded. In the absence of their husbands, 
Kurdish women assume authority and act as the head of the 
household. A Kurdish marriage is governed by the laws and customs 
of Islam. Islamic law allows for a man to have four wives, 
however, only the wealthy assume polygamous relationships; most 
Kurdish men are monogamous.
Finally, the other unique characteristic which distinguishes 
Kurds from Arabs and Persians is Kurdish dress. Distinctive and 
flamboyant costumes are typical. Full, flowing clothes draped with 
floral scarves and cummerbunds are daily wear. Women also tend to 
hang numerous gold chains about their necks and wrists. 
Traditional Kurdish dress was banned under Reza Shah in the 1930s 
and in Turkey in 1937. Once again, the government attempted to 
assimilate the Kurds.
Kurdish Territory and Economic Activity
Kurdistan is that geographic area which is predominately 
populated by Kurds. Part of the Kurds' political problems center 
on the physical properties of the region. For instance, Kurdistan 
does not have access to the sea. They exist in a mountainous 
region encircled by many minorities. Geographically they are
10 Committee Against Repression and For Democratic Rights 
(CARDRI). Sadam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction? Zed Books, LTS. s 
London, 1986. p.130.
7
divided between five countries. Significantly, Kurdistan separates 
the Soviet and Western spheres of influence in the gulf region.
Natural resources are also abundant in Kurdistan, in 
particular, oil, minerals, and water. The Iraqi oil-rich region 
of Kirkuk and Khanaq are reported to have some of the largest 
reserves in the world. Kirkuk is the source of sixty-five percent 
of all Iraqi oil.11 Petroleum is also found in Kermanohah within 
the Kurdish region of Iran.
Significantly, only a small portion of state revenues are 
invested in Kurdistan. The industrial sector of the economic 
community has not grown very much since there has been no major 
investment in the area. A large degree of urban unemployment is 
is aggravated by migration from the rural to the urban areas. The 
rapid development which has taken place throughout much of Iran has 
not reached the remote northern region inhabited by the Kurds. 
Thus, the Kurdish bourgeoisie is based in the fast growing service 
sector and around local administration.12 Even though the Kurdish 
population comprises twenty-five percent of the Iraqi population, 
only seven to twelve percent of the Iraqi development budget was 
allotted to the region during the mid to late 1970s. Four of 150 
industrial projects were arranged for Kurdistan. Steel making 
projects were situated in Arab Iraq despite the fact that the
11 Pelletiere p.167
12 See Ghassemlou, "Kurdistan in Iran", in Gerard Chaliand,
Eaoplt. .Hlthflut. ft.-fiauatcy. The Kurds and .Kurdistan, zed Presst 
London, 1980. p. 116.
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mineral deposits are found in Kurdistan. Roads and irrigation 
efforts have also bypassed areas dominated by the Kurds. Finally, 
the oil refinery promised for Kirkuk in 1970 was never built there, 
instead, it was built in Arab Iraq at a greater expense.
The importance of Kurdish oil cannot be understated. Over 65 
percent of all Iraqi oil is produced in Kirkuk. Export of 
Kurdistan's oil earned the Iraqi Treasury more than $5,762 million 
in 1974, and $7,178 million in 1975.11 Based on the reports above, 
an unbalance proportion of revenues, based on population 
percentage, or mineral wealth, is invested in Kurdistan.
Numerous minerals have been explored in Kurdistan: chrome, 
copper, lead, zinc, sulphur, coal, and stones are found in various 
regions. Despite the large amount of natural resources found in 
the area of Kurdish settlement, the Kurds primarily invest their 
resources in agriculture, producing basic food staples and tobacco. 
The Tigris, the Euphrates, and their tributaries provide a 
plentiful supply of water to important pastoral lands.
KURDISH POLITICS
The Kurds have a strong sense of national identity based on 
the integrity of the territory of Kurdistan. Kurdish national 
identity is rooted in the common history of persecution and neglect 
which they have endured for decades. The Kurds want to align these 13
13 For figures and economic information, see Ismet Sheriff 
Vanly, "Kurdistan in Iraq" in Chaliand, People Without a Country, 
p. 176.
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cultural, ethnic, geographical associations in national 
sovereignty. The Kurds are always Kurds first, and Moslems second, 
a distinction made by choice.
The Kurdish community was traditionally based on nomadic 
tribes of herdsmen. However, government policies have forced the 
Kurds to become more sedentary. In the mid 1800s in Iraq, this 
was accomplished primarily through the sale of community lands to 
the begs, tribal chiefs, and aghas, heads of the clan, who were 
virtually turned into wealthy landlords while the Kurds were left 
to be tenant farmers.14 Ghassemlou writes that the progress of 
economic relations and the scarcity of pastures gradually settled 
the tribes in Iran. Between the two world wars, the Iranian 
government initiated a policy of forcing the Iranian Kurds to 
settle. This policy presented serious consequences for the Kurds. 
First, several thousand Kurds were killed during deportation. Some 
tribes, like the Jalali, were almost completely exterminated. 
Secondly, sedentarization closed the borders to economic exchange, 
thus restricting economic interaction: the Kurds were forced to buy 
all their needs within the boundaries of Iran.11 In both Iran and 
Iraq, the governments chose to settle the Kurdish population so 
that their interests would be served; they could increase state 
control by the assurance of military conscription, and increase 
state revenues through taxes and economic arrangements. Obviously, *15
see Pelletierq, p.39.
15 Ghassemlou, p.110.
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all these benefits were at the expense of the Kurdish population. 
In spite of government attempts to detriballze the Kurds, tribal 
affiliation remains the natural unit of allegiance. The
government's attempt to break tribal alliances has been an attempt 
to divide the Kurds politically, so as to decrease the Kurdish 
threat to the state apparatus.
The Kurds in Iran and Iraq have several party organizations. 
Each is headed by a charismatic leader. Even within these 
political groups, divisions between the modern and traditional 
elements exist. Many obstacles were overcome before the KDP of 
Iraq recognized Mulla Mustafa Barzani, a tribal man, as a 
legitimate representative of their organization. The Kurdish 
political movement has continually been devoid of unification. 
Unfortunately, rivalries and hostilities are generally the focus 
of intra-Kurdish political cooperation.
The Kurds form a nation in Iran and Iraq which is easily 
distinguished from other groups. After World War I, colonialism 
geographically divided the Kurds. Consequently, the leaders of 
the countries they inhabit have chosen to suppress cultural 
diversity and to exert national unity. Repeated conflicts and 
warfare have expended vital government resources and attempted to 
eliminate the Kurdish threat.
KURDS IN IRAN
After a brief period of autonomy in the Mahabad Republic 
(1945-46), the Kurds have continued to observe inconsistent
11
behavior, unmet promises, and broken agreements by Iranian 
governments. While these governments have virtually opposed most 
Kurdish demands for autonomy, Ironically they have supported the 
Iraqi Kurds In their struggle for independence against the R'athi 
regime. By 1975, the Algiers Accord terminated Iranian funds to 
the Iraqi Kurds. However, the Iraqis broke that agreement in 1980 
leaving the Iranians free to renew their aid to the Iraqi Kurds.
The Kurds in Iran are estimated at four million or 
approximately sixteen percent of the population.16 The Iranian 
Kurdish movement functions independently of the Kurdish movements 
in Iraq and Turkey, yet strives to achieve the same goals of 
autonomy in the Iranian region of Kurdistan.
Kurdish Democratic Party
The primary political organization the Iranian Kurds identify 
with is the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). It emerged as an 
intellectual urban movement in the Iranian republic of Mahabad in 
the 1940s. Initially, the organization was called Komala i Zhian 
i Kurdistan (the Committee of the Life or Resurrection of 
Kurdistan) or Komala.17 The party's purpose was not difficult to 
define; they sought to institutionalize Kurdish nationalists' 
goals. Komala's leaders looked to their mature Iraqi counterparts 
for political advice. Membership was open to any Kurd. Thus Shi'a
16 CARDRI #3, ]?.199
17 Pelletiers, 103
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Kurds and Christian Assyrians, considered to be Kurds by race, were 
accepted. At the sane tine, other racial groups such as the 
Azerbaijani Turks were excluded.18 Konala grew rapidly, it was 
fomed with a few individuals and quickly spread outside of the 
Hahabad province. On August 15, 1945, the Kurdish Denocratic Party 
(KDP) was founded in Hahabad with Konala as its base. The KPD 
progran included freedon and self-governnent for the Kurdish people 
within the Units of the Iranian state; the Kurdish language to be 
used in education and to becone the official language in 
adninistrative affairs; election of the provincial council of 
Kurdistan; establishment of unity with other oppressed national 
ninority groups; inprovenent of education, agriculture, and the 
econonio situation; and, finally, efforts to enable the Kurdish 
people to strive freely for the happiness and progress of their 
country.19
Actually, the Konala changed their name to the Kurdish 
Democratic Party in order to receive aid from the Soviets who 
insisted that the Kurds associate themselves with the democratic 
movement of people against fascism. This association was 
illustrated by incorporating the word "democratic" into the 
organization's title.20
See Eagleton Jr., William. The Kurdish Republic of 1946. 
oxford University Press: London, New York, Toronto, 1963. pp. 33-
35.
19 Ghassemlou, p.76.
20 Eagleton, p.45.
13
Dr. Abdur Rahman Ghassero?.ou is the leader of the Iranian KDP. 
Prior to 1970, the KDP of Iran abandonod a number of progressive 
goals for a purely nationalist focus. Since 1973, the party has 
functioned under a bicameral system which consists of a central 
committee and a congress. Representatives of congress come from 
all areas of Kurdistan and have voting privileges to determine the 
future orientation of the Iranian KDP, including membership of the 
Central committee. This party has enjoyed the support of many 
Kurds and was recognized by the Iranian left during the Shah's 
rule.21 The political party was banned by the Iranian government 
in August 1979 after serious armed clashes between the new Islamic 
regime and the rebellious Kurds.
In 1981, in response to various accusations made by the 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Dr. Ghassemlou sought to clarify the position 
of the KDP. This statement implicitly defines the political 
doctrine of the KDP then and now. First and foremost, the KDP 
supports autonomy for the Kurds which he carefully distinguished 
from independence. Thus the army, national currency, and foreign 
policy would remain under government control. The purpose of 
autonomy is for the Kurds to control the internal administration 
of Kurdistan, to allow children to learn Kurdish language and 
culture in school, and to direct internal security. Finally, he 
commented that the KDP strongly supports and are fighting for a
sea A.R. Ghassemlou, "Le Kurdistan d'lran" in Lea Kurdee 
at le Kurdistan. Edited by Gerard Chaliand, Francois Masperot 
Paris, 1978.
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democratic Iran, where all groups, minorities and majorities, may 
participate free of government oppression. All minorities should 
be granted status equal to the Kurds and given the right to publish 
books and other literature in their native language.
Komala
The second and less influential political organization in Iran 
is named Komala. Komala is the Kurdish word for committee. Very 
little information is available through the public media on the 
Komala. However, there is evidence of a Marxist-Leninist 
orientation independent of Soviet support. This organization 
commenced publio activities in mid 1979. The Komala have 
advocated overthrowing the Iranian regime as a solution to Kurdish 
autonomy problems. The Komala joined a couple non-Kurdish leftist 
groups with a similar agenda in 1984. The Communist Party of Iran 
was formed from this merger.
Relations between the Komala and the KDP have been difficult. 
Their different ideologies have been incompatible. The Komala 
views the KDP as the "bourgeois party of Kurdistan" and the "class 
enemy." Although confrontations have taken place, the frequency 
of attacks has been small yet severe. In 1984, clashes held a 
Komala member responsible for the death of a KDP commander. 
However, the Komala continue to favor cooperation with the KDP in 
order to more effectively confront the government. They plan to 
work out these differences only after autonomy is achieved.
No precise information nor figures are available, but, the
15
KDP is supposedly the largest and most powerful organization, with 
the Komala trailing closely behind.22 The KDP enjoys the support 
of the urban intellectual class and has had stronger relations with 
the Iraqi government. The Komala's ideological orientation has 
mainly drawn the intellectuals and low income peoples to it. 
Thus, the two groups appear to have different spheres of influence.
Political Leaders
In addition to the leaders of the established political 
organizations, the sheiks, or religious leaders of the Sunni sect, 
exert considerable influence on Iranian Kurds. Each Sheik of 
importance has a great number of supporters (murids, dervishes, 
suffis) among the people. Sheik Ezzndin Husaeini is no exception. 
He h&3 been a voice of the Iranian Kurds for many years. He and his 
brother, Sheik Jaial enjoy the support of the KDP and the Komala.
In the past, he has acted as a representative of the entire 
Kurdish republic, advocating Kurdish willingness to negotiate 
autonomy with the government. The Ayatollah Khomeini responded to 
the Sheik's influence in 1980 when he issued a death threat to 
Sheik Husseini.23
22 "A Glance at the Present Situati.cn in Kurdistan: KPP-Komala 
Disputes," Iran Press Digest. Vol. 4, No. 29, 23 July 1985. pp. 
5,6.
23 See London Times. 6 Dec 1979, p. 8. Also Christian.flgjftngfi 
Monitor. 13 June 1980, p.12.
KURDS IN IRAQ
The country of Iraq is internally divided by various splinter 
groups. The Arabs and the Kurds are the two major ethnic groups 
in Iraq. The Kurds comprise about twenty-three percent of the 
Iraqi population of 13 million, while the Arabs make up the other 
seventy-five percent.24 The Kurds' {in the north and northeast 
region of Iraq) call for autonomy has consistently been the source 
of intense conflict for the Iraqi government. Lacking a common 
national identity and system of control, repression and violence 
are used to establish order. This means has generated enormous 
costs for the government, draining vital resources and diverting 
attention from foreign affairs.
Patriotic union of Kurdistan
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is a well developed 
organization. Under the leadership of Jalal Talabani, the PUK has 
attempted to build a popular base through small units. It was 
established as a "semi-front" of four different Kurdish groups in 
reaction to Mulla Mustafa Barzani's decision to end the armed 
struggle in Iraq following the 1975 Algiers Accord.2S The coalition 
was not only a reaction but also the realization that the Kurdish 
struggle must be unified if it is to confront successfully its 
oppressors. Even though the PUK is committed to Kurdish unity, it *29
24 McLaurin, p.75
29 See Michael Levy, "Kurdish Autonomy in Iraq," in Cultural 
Survival Quarterly, Vol. 8, no. 4, Deo 1984, p.50-52.
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has traditionally experienced conflict with the KDP. Talabani 
condemns the Barzani leadership as "reactionary.1,26
After the KDP divided in 1964, Talabani set up headquarters 
in Damascus. He returned after Barzani fled to Iran in 1975 to 
direct the Peshmerqa guerillas.26 7 * Since his return, the winter 
headquarters, based in NavZang, has been equipped with shelter for 
political leadership, training schools, a rudimentary hospital, a 
printing press, and even a power station.
The PUK is also known for its links to the Iran, both the 
Iranian regime under the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Kurds. 
During a trip to the United States in June 1988, Talabani defended 
ties to the Ayatollah since the alliance has offered him 
substantial military support.26 The PUK has informal links with 
the Iranian Kurdish movement. Talabani decided to help the Iranian 
Kurds' uprising in 1980. (Barzani opposed this action.) The group 
provide aid and support during battles and even allowed the Iraqi 
army to pass through territory under PUK control in order to 
deliver Iraqi arms to Ghassemlou.
The PUK shares some Arab support as well. It has been linked 
to Iraqi revolutionary groups including B'ath Socialist Party, Arab 
Socialist Movement, and Iraqi Communist Party (dependent on Iraqi-
26 See Ali-Fuat Borovali, "Kurdish insurganoies, the Gulf War, 
and Turkey's Changing Role," Conflict Quarterly. Vol. VII, no.4, 
p. 36.
27 The Peshmerga Guerillas, are Kurdish soldiers engaged in 
armed conflict.
28 New York Times. 6/22/88, p.3.
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Soviet relations). Other allies have included Mprogressive 
elements" of the Iraqi army, Syrian B'ath sympathizers, Nasserites, 
and, sporadically, the Islamic movement in Iraq. These groups have 
aligned to portray themselves as a serious threat with the motive 
of overthrowing the government and forming a coalition government.
Similarly, their autonomy plans is willing to leave foreign 
affairs, budget and defence matters in the hands of the government. 
They, like other Kurdish political organizations, practice an armed 
struggle using guerilla war tactics against the Iraqi government.
Kurdish Democratic Party
The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq was legalized with 
a leftist program, aimed at radical land reform and a commitment 
to bring Iraq's foreign policy closer to the Soviet Union and 
socialist states.29 The TOP was under the leaderehip of Mustafa 
Barzani from the late 1950s until his death in 1979. Barzani is 
notorious for his controversial political actions. He had aligned 
himself with the Shah of Iran, even fighting against fellow Iranian 
Kurds. In an interview with The Washington Post. Barzani said he 
would give mineral and oil rights to an American Company in return 
for U.S. support.30 Much of Barzani'ii activities were devoted to
29 See Hassan Arfa, Iht.. KUfdat___An Historical A Political
study. Oxford University Preset London, 1966. p.75,106.
30 Interview with Washington Post 22 June 1973. In J.M. 
Abdulghani, Iraq and Irani The Years of crisis. Croom Helm: 
London, Sydney, 1984. p.138
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consolidating and expanding his own position as a Kurdish leader, 
ironically, at the expense of the Kurdish movement.31
Until Mulla Mustafa Barzani became the leader, the 
intellectuals were unable or unwilling to tolerate the
"backwardness" of the less-educated tribesmen. Barzani's position 
made the party appear more flexible and accepting. As a result, 
the KDP became more popular among tribesmen and membership began 
to cut across class lines. However, cooperation suffered in 1964; 
the KDP leaders of Iraq and Barzani's Kurdish tribes were in 
disagreement. This conflict resulted in Barzani driving the KDP 
leaders, Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad, into Iran. Barzani was 
an integral part of the Kurdish movement. His fierce and 
charismatic pesonality confronted government forces and rallied the 
people. Barzani's support for the Kurdish national movement lasted 
his entire lifetime. His death, in March 1979, marked the end of 
a great period in Kurdish histBoflowing the Algiers 
Agreement and the subsequent departure of Mulla Mustafa in 197S, 
the KDP splintered into several factions, including the Kurdish 
Democratic Party Provisional Command (KDPPC). The KDPPC is led by 
Barzani*s sons Idris and Masoud. The Barzanis have followed 
paternalistic tradition by cooperating with the Iranian government. 
The KDP Preparatory Committee under the leadership of Mahmoud 
Uthman, as well as other small organizations, claim to represent
31 MoLaurin p.98
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Kurdish nationalists in Iraq.52 53*
The Kurds have joined other oppressed groups to form 
coalitions such as the High Committee of the Progressive National 
Front and the Democratic Patriotic Front. The Progressive National 
Front is a coalition building organization of progressive elements 
in the Iraqi political community. The government allows this group 
to exist as a device to minimize conflict and rivalry among 
contending political parties.55 The Democratic Patriotic Front 
(DPF) and the Democratic Patriotic and National Front (DNPF), both 
were organized in November 1980. The DPF front includes the Iraqi 
Communist Party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Kurdistan 
Socialist Party. They advocated the overthrow of sadam Hussein and 
a coalition government which will grant Kurdish autonomy. Some Arab 
nationalists were against KDP membership, instead they favored the 
PUK, thus the DNPF was formed.34 Factional divisions continue to 
plague the coalitions and deter their attempt to unify and pose a 
serious threat to the regime of Sadam Hussein.
KURDS IN TURKEY, SYRIA, AND THE U.S.S.R.
The Kurds in Turkey represent a significant portion of the 
population, in the census of 1970 there was 8.5 million Kurdish 
speakers or 23.8 percent of the population. The region of
52 MoLaurin, p. 104.
53 MoLaurin, p.88
34 CARDRI, p. 172-173.
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Kurdistan within Turkey is the largest and most populous part of 
Kurdistan. Official state ideology presents the ethnic group as 
a Turkic people or Mountain Turks and Kurdish as a dialect of 
Turkish. Any opposition to this view is considered subversive and 
is immediately punished. Social services such as education and 
health care are extremely poor in Kurdistan. Many Kurds, some 
estimates suggest as high as seventy percent, are illiterate. Like 
those in Iran and Iraq, the Kurds are predominately Muslim. Many 
Kurds live in rural areas. Although rapid urbanization has taken 
place, the social status of the Kurds is low. Many are unemployed 
and live in shanties or slums. Political organizations were formed 
rather recently and are frequently engaged in armed struggle. As 
a subsitute for arms however, leaders of the political movement 
have recognized the effectiveness of peaceful struggle and have 
begun to employ such strategies.
The Kurds in Syria and the U.S.S.R. are numerically less 
significant than the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. In Syria, 
there are an estimated 825,000 Kurds.35 Historically, Syrian Kurds 
have been repressed, Kurds have been subjected to administrative 
harassment, police raids, and re-settlement policies. Kurdish 
literary works have been seized or banned, and folk music has been 
forbidden. However, in 1976, tensions were relaxed by the 
government. Most Kurds live relatively free of oppression, 
however, an informal Kurdish movement exists. The frontiers of the
35 See Mustafa Nazdar, "The Kurds in Syria", in Chaliand, 
People Without A Country, p.211.
U.S.S.R. do not indue any region predominately populated by Kurds 
or contiguous with Kurdistan. However, several Kurdish communities 
are scattered throughout the Transcaucasian and Central Asian 
Republics, in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghiz, 
and the Turkoman S.S.R. Soviet Kurds enjoy a respected and 
properous position in Soviet society. Despite the distance between 
the communities themselves and between them and Kurdistan, Soviet 
Kurds retain their ties to Kurdistan through language and other 
customs.
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE '70S AND THE '80S 
KURDISH AUTONOMY IN IRAQ
A Kurdish autonomous region was created by the national 
government of Iraq in 1974. Autonomy provides a small amount of 
self rule in three governorates, one of which functions as the 
administrative center. The elective legislative council is 
invested with the power "to develop the region and promote its 
social, cultural, constructional, and economic utilities within 
the bounds of the state's general policy, to suggest a budget for
the region.... " The autonomy plan established an Executive
Council to administer the region.36 Kurdish is the language for 
all official communications. However, the Iraqi central government 
maintains effective control over the administrative affairs of the
36 McLaurin, p.86> 103. See Appendix A for chart compiled by 
authors of this book whioh outlines the autonomy plan.
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region. The Kurds have limited authority over internal affairs; 
they administer justice, domestic policy, and internal security. 
Positions of financial executive and the judicial powers are in the 
hands of the B'ath.
THE ALGIERS ACCORD
On March 7, 1975, during an OPEC conference in Algiers, Iran 
and Iraq agreed to end their longstanding rivalries. At that time, 
the Algiers Accord settled the controversial Shatt nl-Arab border 
dispute and effectively ended Iranian support to the Iraqi Kurds. 
Arab and Kurdish response to the arrangement was one of great 
surprise.
The Shatt al-Arab is the wide estuary of the Tigris river 
forming the southernmost border of Iraq. This waterway links the 
only Iraqi deep water port at Basra to the Persian Gulf. The Shaftt 
has continually been a source of tension between Iran and Iraq. 
This particular agreement established the thalweg or median line 
as the international boundary between Iran and Iraq.37 Exclusive 
Iraqi control of the Shatt was effectively terminated and unlimited 
Iranian navigational rights were introduced.
In addition, the Accord ended Iranian aid to the Iraqi Kurds 
and closed the northern border between Iran and Iraq. Both 
parties recognised the oppressed minorities as each government's 
vulnerability. Thus, in the early-to-mid 1970s, Iraq supported the
37 On the Iraq side, the Algiers Agreement abrogated the 
Sa'dabad Pact of 1937.
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Baluchis and the Arab rebellions in Iran while Iran aided the 
Kurdish movement in Iraq. Both Iran and Iraq wanted to manipulate 
internal weaknesses of their enemy to serve their own national 
interests.
I
Iranian support of the Iraqi Kurds fomented their unrest. 
External support magnetized their confidence and solidified their 
determination to achieve their goals of autonomy. Thus, the 
motivating force for Iraq to sign the accord was to force Iran to 
cease support of the Iraqi Kurdish rebellion which had consumed 
enormous amounts of Iraqi financial and military resources. 
MoLaurin writes that external Iranian aid to the Kurds intensified 
Iraqi fears. Accordingly, Iraq'c dependence on Soviet military 
equipment became more extensive during the 1970s. Soviet military 
advisers and substantial supplies of equipment encouraged the Iraqi 
regime to renew their offensive against Barzani and the KDP 
peshmerga guerillas. However, the Algiers agreement effectively 
ended the war between the government in Baghdad and the Kurds in 
the north. After the announcement, Hustafa Barzani proclaimed
defeat and ended his rebellion. He and his family, close
associates, and the KDP Peshmerga fled to Iran while some Kurds 
remained in Iraq. The Iraqi government offered amnesty to all 
rebels who would lay down their arms.
Barzani*s evacuation left a temporary power vacuum in Iraqi
I
Kurdistan which was filled by old Barzani cohorts, Tal.abani and 
Ahmad. Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 
moved from Damascus in order to re-organize the remaining Iraqi
peshmerga guerillas. Ibrahim Ahnwei, former Secretary General and 
ideological leader of the KDP returned to Iraq to assume the 
pc'1 itical leadership vacancy.
The Iraqis' desire and need to get the better of the Kurds 
simultaneously coincided with the Iranian objective to end bitter 
frontier disputes and hostilities. The Algiers Accord of 1975 
eliminated Kurdish interference in the Iran-Iraq power struggle 
for control of the Persian Gulf. Finally, the closed Iranian 
border between Iraq and Iran ended any renewed subversive 
activities within Iran and prevented the Iraqi Kurds from receiving 
Iranian aid.*8
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
Separatist movements such as the Kurds' were heavily oppressed 
during the third quarter of the century. The Shah refused to 
recognize the existence of Kurds as a distinct ethnic group. 
Rather, assimilation was vigorously advocated as a remedy to unify 
the minorities within Iran.* 19 SAVAK, the Iranian secret police, 
were active in Iranian Kurdistan as well. The corrupt activities 
of SAVAK was a major complaint of the Kurds and other opposition
38 The Iraqi Kurds were also receiving aid from both Israel 
and the United States. Israeli advisers among Iraqi Kurds were 
confirmed by Prime Minister Begin. Kurdish unrest diverted Iraq's 
attention and resources from "Zionist imperialism". The United 
states, on the other hand, was closely alligned with the Shah of 
Iran and supported his aspirations to control the Persian Gulf.
19 See Ghassemlou, "Le Kurdistan d'lran" in Gerard Chaliand, 
Lea Kurdes et Kurdistan. Francois Masperot Paris, 1978. p.187.
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groups. Barzani was accused of cooperating with 3AVAK against the 
Iranian Kurds. The Kurds demanded that the government eliminate 
corrupt repression and place internal security control in Kurdish 
hands.
The Kurds in both Iran and Iraq looked towards the Iranian 
Revolution for a solution. Khomeini's promise to liberate and to 
equate the status of oppressed minorities generated large amounts 
of support for the Islamic fundamentalists. These hopes were soon 
dashed by the increasingly repressive and anti-minority stance of 
the Islamic regime. Instead of working with the Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the Kurds began to take advantage of the new 
revolutionary government's weaknesses. Shortly after the Islamic 
republic was established, the Kurdish offensive was renewed.
The province of Nahabad was once again the scene of conflict 
between Kurdish rebels and government forces. The clashes ended 
in a stalemate and the two parties went to the negotiating table. 
The government proposed an eight point plan for limited autonomy. 
This plan was rejected by the Kurds. Thereafter, the Komala 
initiated fighting in the province of Sanadaj which ultimately 
led to more negotiations. These negotiations were partially 
successful, Ibrahim Yunes (a Kurd) was appointed governor of 
Iranian Kurdistan. A committee of Kurds was given power to appoint 
security forces in the provinco and to oversee the provincial 
administration of Kurdish schools.40
40 Pelletiers, p. 179.
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Stephen Pelletiere suggests that these particular rebellions 
were the result of an dramatic increase in wheat prices 
subsequently undercut by the government. In the last days of the 
Shah's rule and the early days of the Ayatollah's, wheat prices 
rose from 8,000 rials to 15,000 rials. The Kurds realized a 
fortune was to be made in the wheat producing region of Kurdistan. 
However, they were short-changed by Khomeini's control of 
profiteering. Thus, the Iranian Kurds reached into their arms 
cache and instigated a revolt.41 Khomeini's action regarding the 
wheat provided the necessary impulse to reinitiate the Kurdish 
rebellion. However, if this event had not occurred, some other 
action by the Iranian government would have instigated a renewed 
offensive. The Kurds supported Khomeini because he suggested that 
he would be the liberator of minorities. His failure to do so 
placed the Kurds into the retrospective position of pre-Khomeini 
days.
Ayatollah Talaghani, Sheik Ali-Tehrani, and Banisadr were the 
chief mediators of the dispute. Spehr Zabih, in his book Iran since 
the Revolution, notes Khomeini's repeated attempt to thwart 
peaceful settlements. By the summer of 1979, Khomeini had dealared 
a jihad, or Islamic Holy War, on the Kurds. The Islamic leader 
wanted the Revolutionary Guards to successfully defeat the Kurds. 
Continually hopeful of a military victory, the Ayatollah would
41 During this period, countless weapons were smuggled into 
Iran by Iraqi refugees and stored for later use. These weapons, 
were used for the Iranian Kurdish revolt immediately after the 
revolution.
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reject imminent proposals of autonomy.
The Kurds, at this time, controlled eighty percent of their 
region. They opted to withdraw from the major cities and towns to 
the mountainous regions of Kurdistan. This liberated region was 
controlled by all the Kurdish groups. Furthermore, Ghassemlou 
turned down a seat in the Constitutional Assembly, Sheikh Husseini 
denounced the election of two non-Kurdish parliamentary 
representatives from Mahabad as a fraud. The Ayatollah was irate, 
he declared an all out offensive on the Kurds.
In an attempt to pacify Khomeini and convince him that they 
would not align with either superpower, the KOP congress of April 
1980 announced their support for the government of the Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Banisadr, the president, went on record for his support 
of the local minorities' right for limited autonomy. Dr. 
Ghassemlou in April 1981 sought to clarify the position of the KDP: 
they sought autonomy, not independence. He reiterated support for 
democracy in Iran, or, in other words, the full participation of 
the Iranian masses and freedom of political parties. Ghassemlou 
also rejected allegations that the KDP of Iran had accepted foreign 
aid and announced that the KDP had no intention of doing so.42
FORCED ARABIZATION
The late 1970s and early 1980s was a period of deportation 
and devastation for the Iraqi Kurds. Between 1975 and 1978, the
42 Sepher Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution. Johns Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore, Maryland, 1982. p. 85,86,87.
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Committee Against Repression and For Damooratio Rights in Iraq 
estimated that over 1000 Kurds were executed in Iraq and thousands 
of Kurds were forcibly removed from their homes. An estimated 
350,000 people were deported during this period and 240 Kurdish 
villages were burned down. Furthermore, all legal means of 
expression for Kurds were banned, including the Kurdish press, 
their political, social, and vocational organizations.43 In the 
1980s, the Cultural Survival Quarterly reports that between 1976 
and 1986 approximately half a million people were forcibly removed 
from 1,500 villages in Iraqi Kurdistan. The majority of them were 
Kurds, but Assyrians and non-Muslim Yezidi were also deported.44 
Many of these Kurds were resettled in Southern Iraqi deserts, while 
others fled to Iran. Deported Kurdish families were rehoused in 
army-type barracks. Over 500,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees were 
absorbed into Iran. The forced Arabization of ethnio minorities 
was effectively a renewed offensive against the Kurds. The Iraqi 
government want to re-populate the area with other ethnic groups 
so the Kurds would no longer be the majority. Arabization 
attempted to destroy Kurdish morale, separate entire families, and 
reek havoc on the entire Iraqi Kurdish population.
43 CARDRI, p.50.
44 see Levy, p.29.
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THE GULF WAR
In September, 1980, Iraq abrogated the Algiers Treaty and 
Iraqi forces entered Khuzestan. The Kurds played an Interesting 
role In the Iran-Iraq conflict. Both Iran and Iraq wanted the 
Kurdish wars to continue so that the energy of the enemy was not 
specifically centered on the war. As a result, Iran enjoyed the 
support of the Barzanis in Iraq, while Iraq has supported 
Ghassemlou of the Iranian KDP and cooperated with Talabani of the 
PUK.
In December 1980, Iraq began to support the Iranian Kurdish 
autonomy movement and Iraqi forces entered Iranian Kurdistan. Iraq 
pursued a strategy of dismembering Iran by aiding its separatist 
movements.*5 Actually, this invasion moved the war out of the Gulf 
and rendered a dual enemy for the Iranians: the Kurds and the 
Iraqis. This was an effective, intense offensive which inevitably 
led to Tehran's unsuccessful offer in April 1981 to offer amnesty 
to all Kurdish rebels who would lay down their arms.
Ironically, Sadam Hussein simultaneously supported the deaths 
of Iranian Kurds while he was brutally suppressing his own Kurdish 
population. By employing Iranian Kurds in battle, it appeared that 
Sadam Hussein was cooperating with the Kurdish group. However, he 
was acting consistently with government policy which aimed to 
eliminate the Kurds. Through warfare, Kurds were being killed, who
See "A New Front in a Slow War", The Economist 3 Jah 1981, 
vol 278: p. 28-29. Also Pelletiers, p.184.
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was actually killing then was trivial.44 * In response to chemical 
warfare, forced deportations, and other ill-treatment, the Iraqi 
Kurds renewed their offensive during this time period as well. The 
Kurds, as did the central governments, recognized the dramatic 
vulnerabilities the war provided for all the involved parties.
In the summer of 1983, Iran invaded Iraqi Kurdistan. At that 
point, the Barzanis and the Iranian government coordinated their 
attack. Talabani was engaged in armed conflict with the Iraqi 
government at the time of the invasion. Unfortunately, intense 
rivalries between Barzani and Talabani prevented them from joining 
together to attack Iraq. Rather, Talabani accepted negotiations 
with the Iraqi government to avoid fighting alongside the Barzanis. 
Iraq desperately needed the Kurdish rebels under Talabani to fight 
Barzani and the Iranians and for Talabani to refrain from attacks 
on the government; too many war fronts were exhausting Iraqi 
military resources.47 Iraq had failed to hold off Iranian land 
advances, although it had made substantial gains at sea.
A ceasefire was arranged almost immediately, but autonomy 
negotiations between Talabani and Iraq were dragged out over a ten 
month period. The most controversial dispute was over the oil-rich 
region of Kirkuk, which the Iraqis did not want to release to 
Kurdish control. Finally an agreement of limited Kurdish autonomy
44 This idea was brought up by Dr. Vera Beaudin Saeedpour,
Creator and Director of the Kurdish Library in Brooklyn, NY during
an telephone interview on 4/24/89.
47 Pelletiere, p.186. See also "The Kurds; The War Within a 
War," The Economist 29 Sept. 1984. vol 292; p. 39.
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was made in return for PUK support in the north. In January 1984, 
the two adversaries exchanged prisoners. The Kurds' primary 
responsibility was to act as border guards. No agreement vras ever 
reached and the brief ceasefire broke down. Although it was 
advantageous for the Iraqi government to negotiate a settlement, 
circumstances had become less tense. There had been little land 
warfare which reduced the importance of the ceasefire to the 
Iraqis; therefore, the Iraqis were extremely reluctant to 
immediately relinquish Kirkuk.
AFTER THE CEASEFIRE: THE KURDS TODAY
During the summer of 1988, Iran accepted United Nations 
Resolution 438 calling for a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War. Since 
that time, the Kurdish battle has intensified. The Iraqi 
government condemns the Kurds in Iraq as traitors and terrorists 
because they allied with enemy forces and fought against government 
troops. Since Iraqi troops were freed from war, a renewed 
government offensive has led to mass destruction in Kurdistan. 
Chemical warfare has been employed to eliminate the Kurdish 
"problem." Furthermore, reports suggest that in 1988 villages were 
being bulldozed and entire towns razed. As a result of these 
tactics, thousands of Kurds fled to Turkey and the international 
community has "condemned" Iraq for the use of chemical weapons. 
The United States Congress went so far as to propose sanctions 
against the Iraqi government. This resolution prohibited the sale 
or export to Iraq of weapons, military equipment, and items such
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as trucks, helicopters and computers that could be used by the 
military. However, the resolution was unsuccessful as were other 
international attempts to provide aid to the Kurds.
Most recently, there have been reports that since 1987, the 
Kurdish leaders have put aside quarrels to form a working 
relationship. An Iraq-Kurdistan Front has been formed between the 
KDP and PUK, as well as other smaller groups in Iraq. This front 
has established cordial relation with Ghassemlou in Iran. Some 
analysts suggest that the Kurds are more unified today than ever 
before. However, details of this agreement have been concealed 
from the public and, therefore, it is difficult to determine the 
extent of the collaboration.4*
KURDISH POLITICAL CULTURE
When I initially began this project, I asked myself, why do 
the Kurds continue to struggle for autonomy? Why do the Kurds or 
any national movement subject themselves to such devastation? Why 
would they want to assume responsibilities of independence? Now, 
I realize that Kurdish life is deeply embedded in Kurdish culture 
and identity. Societal traditions which so many take for granted 
are precisely what the governments of Iran and Iraq are trying to 
deprive them. Suppression, oppression, and repression are forces 
the Kurds have confronted for decades and will face in future days. 
They have acquired the necessary resources to counter these forces; 48
48 Interview with Dr. SaeedPour of the Kurdish Library in 
Brooklyn, NY.
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yet they are unable to permanently defeat them.
VALUES
It is Important to understand basic Kurdish values and what 
is important to them.
Independence: Within their own political culture and outside
of it, the Kurds want to prov’.de for themselves. They want an 
equitable share of the country's wealth so that they may distribute 
it throughout their territory.
Religion: Religious freedom is an important aspect of Kurdish 
goals of mutual equality. Although most Kurds are Huslim, their 
national identity has precedence over their religious one. 
Religious affiliation is recognized as a personal choice, and not 
seen as a matter of the state, primarily beoause all Kurds are not 
Sunni Muslims, and Sunni Kurds in Iran are persecuted by the 
Islamic Republic,.
Language: The Kurds share something unique that Arab and
Persian countrymen and countrywomen do not adhere to. A distinct 
society and common history separates them from their oppressors and 
creates a character unique to the Kurds. Language and expression 
are invaluable. Language identifies common Kurdish history. It 
serves as a vehicle to initiate Kurdish children into the society. 
This inalienable cultural right assures freedom to study, to 
publish, and to communicate in one's own language.
Non-discrimination: The Kurds value the right to equality
and to identify with one another. They are rejected in Iran
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because they adhere to Sunni Islam. Iraq has not only 
discriminated on economic grounds, but also attempted cultural 
genocide. The Kurds recognize the right of minorities to 
associate freely and to preserve their identity.
These values are the basis of Kurdish political culture. It 
is a separatist movement primarily because these characteristics 
unquestionably intimidate their oppressors. The governments have 
ruthlessly repressed the Kurds by denying them their cultural 
heritage. Kurdish solidarity is a response to this oppression.
ALLEGIANCE
Allegiance is the bond which attaches the Kurds to their 
liberation movement. Although no empirical data is available, one 
may speculate that a sense of political obligation and emotional 
sentiments, and links to the sovereign bodies explain Kurdish 
allegiance. Host Kurds are politically obligated to support 
Kurdish autonomy. A sense of duty to the movement is evident. The 
nation as a symbol and an expression creates some type of emotional 
and social contract. The movement has reached all elements of 
society; it was initiated in the intellectual circles and sustained 
ly the tribal community. The actual movement has reached almost 
every geographical region in Kurdistan, from the cities to the 
difficult terrain of the mountain ranges. When David Adamson, a 
British journalist, travelled through Kurdistan, he depended on the 
extensive networking system which passed him from one mountain 
village to the next, and to and from the cities. Different groups
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and communities contributed to his successful, safe travels and 
extensive journal of interviews with influential political 
leaders.49
Personal sentiments cultivate this sense of obligation. 
First, Kurdish values are inherent. This essential innateness 
creates ties to the larger Kurdish movement. Secondly, personal 
loss creates a political obligation. Because Kurdish history is 
plagued with continual wars, most families have lost a loved one 
through violence. The introduction of chemical weapons during 
the Iran-Irag War has subjected the entire population, including 
children and the elderly, to the harmful effects of chemical 
warfare. The deterioration of personal safety and the destruction 
of the family unit renews the allegiance of the individual to the 
Kurdish struggle.
The Kurds are linked to the central government by 
international law. Laws imposed by a foreign body immediately 
after World War I instigated their problems. However, the Kurds 
do not aim to sever these imposed connections to the central 
government. They have recognized the complexity of the global 
arena and realized their limits. Thus, they want the central 
government to remain as external security. The line is difficult 
to draw, yet some dependence is necessary. A geographically 
divided Kurdistan would have a difficult time establishing their 
own currency, diplomacy, and other institutions a nation state must
49 David Adamson. The Kurdish War. Praegers New York, 
Washington, 1964. pp.1-121.
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support. The pragmatic Kurds have recognized the limits of their 
aspirations. They can only be realistic about what they might 
achieve when they have the opportunity. Thus, they will retain 
ties to the central governments.
THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM
The cause of and the reaction to the struggle is the 
development of Kurdish nationalism. Nationalism is an ideology 
which claims to represent the supreme values of the state and its 
citizens.50 Conversely, the sentiment and attachment of a people 
to a nation and to its interests may also constitute nationalism. 
A defensive Kurdish population has developed like goals to use 
their language and to preserve their identity. Allegiance, 
political obligation, and an awareness of those concepts correlates 
to fora national identity. Kurdish nationalism has evolved in 
accordance with recent modernization. As a society develops and 
becomes more modernized, improved communication and centralization 
yield a keen sense of nationalism. This parallel is evident from 
the role of urban intellectuals and the importance of tribal values 
in contemporary political organizations.
Political consciousness first emerged among urban 
intellectuals. These educated individuals recognized the need to 
align themselves in order to fulfill their political goals. The 
intellectuals gave rise to various organisations which sought to
50 as defined by Chaliand, English text, p.9.
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realize this new-found group consciousness and to popularize a 
support base. Until then, the tribe was the predominant unit of 
allegiance. Tribal affiliation is still evident in Kurdish 
society, however, political commitments have been re-directed from 
the tribe to larger, less distinct, less secure political 
organizations in the community. Many aspects of tribal politics 
have transcended from the traditional environment and continue to 
characterize contemporary political organizations.
As Kurdish tribes became more sedentary, allegiance to the 
tribe gradually decreased. Firstly, a single tribe was not a 
sufficient force to seriously threaten modern government forces. 
Improved communication also forced the Kurds to realize that Kurds 
everywhere shared the same goal of an autonomous province. As life 
became more settled and communities grew larger, a common identity 
emerged among the Kurdish people. This national identity is 
concerned with their right to exist and the integrity of cultural 
and territorial survival.
Because the Kurds began to recognize this national identity, 
they also realized that a voice of expression was necessary. As 
a result, political organizations and Kurdish publications came 
into existence. The Kurdish press emerged as early as 1898. 
Kurdish publications during the Mahabad Republic included a 
newspaper and a political monthly periodical, both called 
Kurdistan. There were also published two primarily. literary
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magazines, Havar and Hilal.81 Today, many books and pamphlets are 
published clandestinely in Kurdistan. Underground newspapers and 
political literature exist, but possession may result in severe 
punishment.
The political unit broadened outside of the tribal base and 
political parties were formed within the Kurdish national movement. 
Tribal elements have persisted in Kurdish politics, taking root in 
leadership, factionalism, and socialism.
9
Charismatic leaders have dominated Kurdish societies since 
the early days. These leaders have a magnetic effect on people. 
Tribal chiefs or begs held the highest status in the tribal 
community; their family enjoyed the benefits of the position as 
well. Aghas, also referred to as descendants of the Kurdish Lords, 
enjoyed a prestigious, influential role in the political community. 
Influence yielded to these leaders is astounding. During the 
nomadic years, extensive tribal organization was necessary to fend 
off attackers since all valuable tribal possessions were present. 
However, the charismatic leader presents us with a contradiction 
in Kurdish character: Kurds are fiercely independent, yet they 
obey and respect political leaders.
Charismatic leaders are typical of present-day Kurdish 
political organizations. Most political leaders retain their 
positions for many years, if and when difficulties emerge, there
see A. Roosevelt, "The Kurdish Republic of Hahabad", in 
Chaliand, English test, p. 146.
/is usually a power struggle which inevitably eliminates the 
opposition. Elimination, in this case, does not refer to death. 
Rather, the ostracized individual usually coalesces with or creates 
another political organization.
Barzani was the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iraq 
for moat of his political career. From 1958 until his death, he 
was vital to the Kurdish nationalist movement of Iraq. When 
internal problems developed between he, Ahmad, and Talabani in the 
mid-1960s, the latter two bowed to his control and left the 
country. Only after Barzani's "defeat" and subsequent departure 
from Iraq in 1975 did the former activists return to organize the 
Iraqi Kurds.
Finally, the other element reminiscent of tribal days is the 
socialist orientation of most modern day political organizations. 
Contemporary Kurdish socialism is linked to tribal communism. 
Historically, tribal lands were owned communally; food and work 
was distributed cooperatively. Kurdish values are based on 
communal property; everyone has some portion of the wealth. 
However, it is interesting that the Kurdish urban educated 
organizers initiated this leftist orientation when they were the 
societal group who chose to move away from the tribal community.52 
Yet, socialism offered the necessary subscription for national 
liberation. 12
40
12 See Bagleton, p.50.
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Theoretically, socialism closely identifies with oppressed 
groups.’3 Ghassemlou, the influential leader of the Iranian Kurds, 
writes under a strong socialist influence in his book, Kurdistan 
and The Kurds. He acknowledges that both Marx and Lenin avow the 
right to self-determination to every nation. He directly quotes 
Lenint ".... the self-determination of nations means the political 
separation of these nations from alien national bodies and the 
formation of an independent and national state.M Marx predicted 
the rise of the proletariat would inevitably overcome the 
bourgeoisie who sustained class distinctions. These "class'* 
distinctions are sustained by the racist, selfish attitudes of the 
suppressive regimes. The Kurds can clearly identify with the 
ideology of Marx for it could have been written for them.
Today, modern political organisations have replaced tribal 
political identities. Certain tribal elements have surpassed 
timely constraints and play a role in contemporary political 
organizations. The importance of Kurdish leaders may not be 
understated. The Kurdish struggle is dominated by a fierce 
dedication to Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds are committed to 
maintain their national identity through political action. Kurdish 
oonsoiousnsss has distinguished its rights and allegiances from 
those of the state. Furthermore, it has given strength to the
93 For instance, the communists in South Africa were the first 
to recognise the fundamental Inequality of apartheid.
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ideology of Kurdish self-determination.M 
WEAKNESSES
A primary weakness of the Kurdish movement is base on 
regional, political geography. Kurdistan is a land locked country 
surrounded by hostile peoples. Furthermore, the region is 
partitioned between five separate countries. Neither the Iranians, 
Iraqis, or neighboring governments want to see the Kurds succeed 
because it could excite other regional ethnic minorities. Thus, 
the likelihood of a single unified Kurdish state incorporating 
Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian Kurds is highly 
doubtful. The division between five separate countries is a 
serious disadvantage to the Kurdish population.
Economically, the rogion of Kurdistan has not enjoyed the 
level of development experienced in Iraq and Iran at large. Host 
Kurds live in small villages of five or ten families to larger 
villages of upto ten thousand. Economic prosperity has not been 
extended *.o these villages. A vast discrepancy exists between the 
larger Arab and Persian community and the Kurds. Furthermore, a 
split occurs within the Kurdish community as well. The 
intellectual upper class is made up of military offices, scholars, 
and professors. At the same time, many peasants are still living 
in a semi-feudal environment. Large landholders (30-50 hectares)
w  For a theoretical discussion of nationalism, see Roger 
Sourton, A Dictionary of Political Thought. (Hill & Wang: New York, 
1982) p. 315, 316.
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have been dissolved, and land redistribution has taken place. In 
1975, estimates suggested that over fifty percent of rural Iranian 
dwellers remained landless, while thirty-two percent owned between 
one to three hectares.M
Another important economic factor affecting the Kurds is their 
oil resources and lack of oil wealth. Although this topic has 
already been explored, suffice it to say that neither the Kurds nor 
the Iraqis are willing to release this land. Neither party can 
afford it financially so the issue will continue to frustrate any 
possible settlements.
The gap between the upper and lower class parallels the
traditional versus modern segments of society. Difficulty between
these two groups has caused uncertainty in political organization.
It is often awkward for a more traditional leader to secure a
leadership position. Chaliand and Ghassemlou also suggest that the
lack of economic development within Kurdistan has made the Kurds
"backwards" compared to other peoples in the region. In their
opinion, "traditionalism" is detrimental to nationalistic
objectives because it encourages divisions within Kurdish society.
"A traditionalism in values, mentality and behavior has 
still not been replaced by an adaptation to the codes of 
modernity; however the knowledge and use of this ritual 
modernity engenders no real change. The fundamental 
values are still those of yesterdayt taotical cunning 
instead of political analysis, olientist manouevrings 
instead of political mobilisation, and a few
revolutionary slogans instead of a real radical 5
55 see Chaliand, p. 116. (English text)
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practice. m3<
I think that representatives and leaders of the Kurdish 
movement must continue to develop skills of diplomacy and political 
networks. In addition to the armed struggle, the Kurds should 
attempt to solidify their support within Kurdistan and in the 
international community.
Finally, if the Kurds are seriously considering their quest 
for autonomy, they must establish some nation building 
institutions. The Kurds have limited resources, yet legitimate 
organizations should be developed to facilitate autonomy once it 
is achieved and to Improve the legitimacy of the Kurdish movement.
THE FUTURE OF THE KURDS
The immediate future of the Kurds has been effected by the 
recent ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. The Kurds held a vicarious 
position in the Iran-Iraq conflict. Battles in the border regions 
created terror and devastation. Aid from irrespective governments 
crossed both borders. Particular organizations and individuals 
have benefited, consequently, aid divided the larger movement. 
The Kurds offered an explicit advantage to whichever government 
they chose to support. For example, when the Iraqis enjoyed the 
support of Iranian Kurds, the Iranian government was actually 
battling a dual defensive. Since hostilities have been minimized 
dramatically, the Kurds no long wield a power-broker position. Now
M Chaliand, English text, p.16.
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the Kurds recognize that government attention has converged on the 
Kurds. As a result, the Kurds must prepare themselves for an all- 
out government offensive, such as the recent, devastating Iraqi 
offensive.
Even with government hostility becoming more dangerous, the 
Kurdish struggle will continue. One might suggest that the Kurds 
should lay down their arms and the war would end. This is not very 
likely. Government oppression will persist. The only prevailing 
question is which element of Kuzdish society or culture the 
government will chose to oppress next. The Kurds are obligated to 
secure basic rights for themselves and their descendants. The 
Kurdish struggle of self-determination within a third world country 
has not received the off-hand support of the left wing in 
international politics so frequently offered to other groups. The 
"rise of the Kurds" is the thesis of the Kurdish movement.57 The 
Kurds realize that they effectively have no friends. It is 
important for the Kurds to continue to develop skills of diplomacy 
in order to secure international support. The influence of outside 
pressure cannot be over-stated. International laws and 
international organizations recognize their right to self- 
determination. Irregardless of these statutes, the Kurds realize 
they struggle alone. Statutes have achieved nothing for them thus 
far. Government pressure has alienated the Kurds and further moved 
them away from assimilation. Now, they must .look inward for *8
57 See Bill Breen, "Kurdistan Culture Preserved", The Christian
Science Monitor. 8 Feb. 1989, p.12.
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strength and outward to the international community for support.
Cultural differences and international boundaries divide the 
Kurds i nd make it unlikely that they will ever unite in one state. 
However, Kurdish nationalism and allegiance will continue to 
strengthen in the face of oppression. They are not fighting 
modernization, they've accepted it. They ara fighting to preserve 
their myths, ideology, and their livelihood. Kurds demand self- 
determination; they are obligated to exist under a system which 
recognizes their fundamental rights. Until these rights are 
assured, the Kurds will continue to struggle.
Based on fundamental differences between the parties, it is 
difficult to imagine a permanent solution being mediated. The 
issues surrounding religious differences, economic disparity, and 
leadership must be resolved. The Kurds will and should demand a 
solution as permanent as one can achieve in this volatile region. 
Although the Kurds seek a solution to their problems, some 
compromise and conciliation will be necessary. Thus far, the Kurds 
have never been satisfied with any autonomy settlements, I think 
it is important that the Kurds recognize the limitations each 
government faces and realize a reconstruction of some of their 
goals may be necessary. A long term solution to this problem will 
integrate the demands and pressures of all the relevant parties.
CONCLUSION
An obvious complication for the Kurdish nationalist movement 
is the antagonism between Kurdish, Iranian, and Iraqi political
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aspirations. While the Iranians are dedicated to Islamic 
fundamentalism, and the Iraqis are concerned with internal 
stability and their position in the Arab world, the Kurds are 
committed to survival. Each government has supported some element 
of the Kurdish movement in order to further its own interests. 
The consequences have been the most severe to the Kurds, causing 
internal divisions and a stronger government offensive.
Iran, the vanguard Islamic Republic, adheres to Shi'a Islam 
and the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic traditionalism. Despite pre­
revolutionary promises to liberate the oppressed, the Islamic 
regime has never followed up its promises. In recent years, the 
foreign policy of the Iranian government has centered on the iran-
Iraq War and an anti-Western stance. The position of the Kurds has
/
largely remained the same. Political instability has diffused any 
government support for Kurdish demands.
In Iraq, Sadam Hussein's determination to Arabize the country 
has practically led to cultural genocide for the Kurds. B'athi 
persecution of the Kurds is a result of the party's commitment to 
their pan-Arab ideology and the survival of their state. The 
Kurdish separatist movement has divided attempts for unity and 
threatened to excite other anti-regime groups. B'athi response to 
the Kurds and other anti-B'ath elements has been violent and 
oppressive. Non-Arab segments of society are suppressed because 
of the threats they pose to the regime. Currently however, the 
Kurds exist as the only major, active opposition to the government 
of Iraq.
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By employing Iranian Kurds in the struggle against Iran and 
through chemical warfare, the Iraqis are openly attempting 
genocide. Either Iran or Iraq could exterminate the Kurds if they 
wished. International condemnation would be only a minor 
consequence; criticism would be slow, ineffective, and short-lived. 
Obviously, the governments of Iran and Iraq enjoy the Kurdish 
presence in the power-play. They are a force easily manipulated 
in necessary contexts, such as conflict between them, collaboration 
with Turkey, or coalescing with the Kurds themselves.
Most people fail to realize the significance of the Kurds 
because there is little information available. Unfortunately much 
information written on the Kurds is ambiguous and incorrect. Few 
newspaper or journal articles are published. Numerous books have 
been written, but the acouraay of the information is questionable. 
Statistics are outdated and unreliable. Articles tend to 
inaccurately describe organisations and alliancss, some of which 
do not exist. Furthermore, many writers, including myself, are 
forced to rely on second-hand accounts of activities in the region. 
Accordingly, events are misconstrued and writing about the Kurds 
is complicated and difficult. The governments are primarily 
responsible for censoring information from the international 
community.
Weak response to Kurdish aspirations is a derivative of 
successful government policy which aims to underestimate the 
importance of the population. They do not want the Kurds to be 
recognised as an oppressed minority. Oppression tarnishes their
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imags and guaationa thair ability to control the state. 
Furthermore, they nay become the xocus of international boycotts 
or sanctions. For these reasons, accurate statistics on the Kurds 
are unavailable. The governments want to diminish the size of the 
Kurdish population and to overstate the success of government 
responsibilities such as education and health services.
The international community is partially responsible for the 
lack of information on the Kurds; largely because the community 
has failed to respond, m e  Kurdish struggle has received only 
limited recognition by international organizations, governments, 
interest groups, and scholars. Only recently have the Kurds began 
to overcome this. The Kurds have begun to assert themselves in the 
international domain by releasing publications, requeeting aid, and 
organizing groups. In the United States, a Kurdish library has 
been established in Brooklyn, New York. It is slowly becoming the 
repository for rare Kurdish books, maps, and costumes. 
Subssqusntly, the library serves as a resource for scholars and 
journalists aoross the world. Also, a Kurdish Program of Cultural 
Survival and other student groups have emerged to encourage support 
and to promote awareness about Kurdish oulture and the Kurdish 
straggle. The Kurds need both the material and moral support of 
the international community to sustain their movement.
The Kurds are an astute group of people. They are keenly 
aware that thair national community is denied the freedom they 
demand. Regardless of any proclaimed government policy, they live 
under a "poliey of terror." Their oppression is constant despite
which government is in power. The Kurdish movement is not unified. 
Problems center around charismatic leaders, traditional elements 
of society, classism, and foreign manipulation. However, the 
Kurdish struggle will continue. Since the Arab Conquest, ancient 
history documents that it is not unusual for the Kurds to rise 
again and have to reconquered many times. They confront their 
oppressors and they refuse to back down. They depend on their own 
strength and courage to survive. The Kurdish population is aware 
of its status ah an oppressed nation under foreign control and the 
Kurdish people reserve the right to determine their own future on 
the land they have occupied for centuries.
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APPENDIX A
Structure of the Kurdish Autonomy Plan
* Chairman is appointed by the president of the republic from among the 
members of the Legislative Council. The chairman in turn chooses members for 
the Executive Committee from among the Legislative Council. The chairman 
and members o f the Executive Council hold the rank o f minister. The president 
has the power to dismiss the chairman; in such a case, the Executive Com­
mittee is dissolved.
Sourct: Compiled by the authors.
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